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INTRODUCTION
Imagine your doctor tells you that a procedure involving removal
of spinal fluid is necessary to diagnose your recurring headaches. He
does not tell you—nor do you inquire about—the risks involved in the
intervention, which include a very small risk of permanent partial
paralysis. Unfortunately, paralysis occurs. American courts have
established a rule of consent that provides that the physician has an
affirmative duty to disclose the material risks inherent in the proposed
therapeutic treatment or surgery.1 Thus, among other claims, you have
a common law right to recover against the physician for failure to
provide adequate informed consent.
Now imagine that, instead of seeking care from your physician,
you have decided to become a participant in a research protocol that
is intended to study the cause of recurring headaches. During the
process of enrolling you in the study, the investigator does not tell
you—nor do you inquire about—the risk of permanent partial
paralysis. Again, unfortunately, paralysis occurs. Although the law
governing human subjects research might lead the investigator to lose
funding, no equivalent private right of action exists in the research
context, and thus you are unlikely to be able to seek damages for the
investigator’s failure to provide adequate informed consent.
Finally, consider a complicating detail to the latter scenario: the
investigator, in the course of the study, runs a test on a biological
sample that he removed during the procedure in order to study a
hypothetical correlation between the headaches and a certain genetic
defect. He discovers, incidentally, that you carry a gene that
predisposes you to Alzheimer’s Disease. Although no law requires the
investigator to tell you this information, there is an emerging general
consensus that the investigator has an obligation to disclose such
findings (or at least the possibility of such findings) to you, which could
also potentially enable you to seek damages where the investigator fails
to make the appropriate disclosures.
That a patient who is harmed by her doctor due to lack of
informed consent has a right to recover is an established tenet of tort
law. However, for historic reasons,2 such a right does not extend to a
research participant3 who is harmed due to a lack of informed consent
1

See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See infra Part I.A.
3
Traditionally, the term “subject” has been used to describe individuals who
enrolled in research protocols, and the federal regulations (the Common Rule and
FDA regulations) employ that term. More recently, commentators have begun to use
the term “participant” “in order to ‘reinforce the aspiration to involve participants
2
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by the investigator in a research protocol. This distinction between the
rights of certain individuals to seek remedies directly from those who
neglected to communicate the risks of an intervention has been the
subject of extensive literature on the doctrine of informed consent,4
although courts have generally been either unwilling or unable to
extend a private right of action to research subjects.
Significantly, however, the typical research model has evolved
since the most notable court efforts to find a duty of care, premised on
a special relationship5 between the investigator and research
participant. In contrast to research protocols that required more
involved medical interventions, protocols that require minimally
invasive procedures—e.g., a simple blood draw for a genetic test or the
use of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)—are much more the norm
today. Further, with almost daily genetic and medical discoveries,
there is an ever-increasing possibility of finding out information about
the research participant that is beyond the scope of the protocol.
Thus, this Article proposes that the emergence of genetic testing
technologies, the proliferation of research involving biological
samples, and the escalating use of medical imaging6 may further
transform the relationship between the investigator and research
participant.
more directly in research and its oversight.’” Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in
Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L. REV. 387, 388 n.1 (2005) (citing Comm. on Assessing the
Sys. for Prot. Human Research Subjects, Inst. of Med., Preserving Public Trust:
Accreditation and Human Research Participant Protection Programs 34 (2001)). Because of
their common and frequent usage, this Article uses the terms “subject” and
“participant” interchangeably, although each term carries with it particular meaning
and significance.
4
See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001); see also generally E. Haavi Morreim,
Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 63 (2003); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert &
Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139 ANN. INTERN.
MED. 40, 40 (2003); Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject
Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229
(2003); Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: a No-Fault Proposal to Compensate
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2012).
5
See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
6
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 39 (Dec. 2013), available at
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.p
df (“Medical imaging—a modality that includes magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
computed tomography (CT) scans, X-rays, neuroimaging, and ultrasounds, along with
techniques such as electroencephalography and electrocardiography that give rise to
data capable of being represented as images—can lead to incidental and secondary
findings.”).
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The right to recover for lack of informed consent is premised on
the duty that arises out of the relationship between the discloser and
the disclosee, which is grounded in the principle of autonomy. In the
treatment context, when physicians fail to inform their patients about
the risks of an intervention, patients who are then harmed by the
undisclosed risks have recourse to a private right of action based in
common law—a claim based on the failure to provide informed
consent.7 At its foundation, this recourse is based on the primacy of
the doctor-patient relationship and arises out of the provider’s duty to
the patient. Breach of that duty—through failure to disclose
information material to the patient’s decision to pursue treatment—
allows the patient to recover damages.
In contrast, research subjects who are harmed by medical
research have no such right of action. The most significant federal
regulation related to human subjects research, the Common Rule,
includes no private right of action for participants who are harmed as
a result of investigators’ failure to disclose the risks of the research;
instead, the penalty for violation of the regulations is typically loss of
federal funding or suspension of the research. The lack of a private
right of action for research harms is often attributed to the absence of
a legally recognized relationship between the investigator and the
participant. Consequently, this Article focuses on one element of tort
liability—the duty of care—because of its centrality to the doctrine of
informed consent and the principle of autonomy that it seeks to
protect. Arguments for informed consent in both the treatment and
research contexts, as well as for disclosure of incidental or secondary
findings, are premised on the autonomy principle.
The evolution in the relationship between investigator and
participant demonstrates the increasing need for a private right of
action for failure to provide informed consent to research. Central to
the contention of this Article, the emerging consensus that
investigators have some obligation to disclose research findings8 to
7

BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 258 (“By granting patients access to the courts for
independent review of their care, society provides a means of compensating patients
who have suffered harms resulting from negligent practices, and of deterring
physicians from engaging in such practices.”).
8
In attempting to address the definitional confusion that has arisen in
attempting to determine the extent of a researcher’s obligation to return secondary
and other research findings, Lisa Eckstein and colleagues have endeavored to suggest
which definitions and conceptualizations are most appropriate to use in future
disclosure frameworks. Lisa Eckstein, Jeremy R. Garrett & Benjamin E. Berkman, A
Framework for Analyzing the Ethics of Disclosing Genetic Research Findings, 42 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 190 (2014). For purposes of this Article, the authors’ definition of “research
finding”—”a new piece of information that relates to a particular individual discovered
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research participants reflects an appropriate response to the changing
nature of the investigator-research participant relationship, rendering
it more like the doctor-patient relationship.
The emerging
expectation that an investigator should disclose (or offer the research
participant the opportunity to receive) findings that are secondary to
the research protocol—potentially accompanied by the associated
private right of action for failure to do so—makes the lack of obligation
to disclose the primary risks of the research protocol itself (and the lack
of direct recourse for failure to do so), even more obvious and
challenging. Thus, this Article proposes that the ethical duty to
disclose research findings represents a shift in the relationship
between the investigator and research participant, which therefore
supports a private right of action for research participants, who, like
patients, are harmed by the failure to provide informed consent.
However, the standard of care for such a private right of action for
research need not—and probably should not—absolutely mirror the
standard of care owed to patients in the clinical setting.
Part I of this Article explores the evolution of, and justification
for, a private right of action for harms that occur due to failure to
provide informed consent in the treatment environment but not the
research setting. Part II then addresses the evolving research model
and, in particular, the investigator-participant relationship generally,
with a focus on the central principle of autonomy. The Article then
turns, in Part III, to the subject of returning or disclosing research
findings in research involving imaging and the testing of genetic and
biological samples. Finally, Part IV recommends a modified approach
to extending the common law claim for lack of informed consent to
the research setting.
I. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR TREATMENT BUT NOT RESEARCH
A. Informed Consent to Treatment
To understand the common law right of action for failure to
provide informed consent to treatment, one must look to its history.
In most states, this negligence-based tort stands in contrast to the
intentional tort of battery.9 The prototypical battery case involves
by virtue of research procedures”—is a particularly useful “catchall” for the incidental
and secondary findings discussed here. Id. at 200.
9
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Med. Ctr., 491
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1992); Mole v. Jutton, 846 A.2d 1035 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); Howard
v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73 (2002); Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638
N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 2002); Messina v. Matarasso, 284 A.D.2d 32 (N.Y.A.D. 2001);
Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1998). But see Montgomery v. Bazaz-
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intentional unauthorized physical contact with a patient where the
contact causes harm.10 However, a patient can recover for battery even
if she is not harmed, if the physician performs the intervention without
the patient’s knowledge or agreement.11 Importantly, battery “assumes
that important medical decisions are implemented through actual
physical touching.”12 Today, battery is invoked at a less frequent rate
than it was historically,13 perhaps because treatment is often conducted
with less physical touching due to the increasing use of noninvasive
tests and procedures.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the medical profession
shifted from a patriarchal system—in which the doctor held all the
information and yielded all decision-making power within the doctorpatient relationship—to a more “patient-centered approach to health
care,”14 based on the ascension of the principle of patient autonomy
within the doctor-patient relationship. Early references to the
emerging doctrine of informed consent appeared toward the
beginning of the twentieth century. In the seminal decision
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, which revolved around
Sehgal, 568 Pa. 574 (2002) (treating both no consent and lack of informed consent as
battery claims). See also DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS, § 308 (2d ed. West 2014) (“The
negligence in the informed consent claim is not negligence in performing a medical
procedure, but rather negligence in failing to explain its risks, alternatives, and other
related information.”).
10
DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS, § 33 (2d ed. West 2014).
11
Id.
12
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 229 (1985).
13
Jerry Menikoff, LAW AND BIOETHICS 156 (2001) (“[T]he tort of battery plays a
relatively minor role in modern doctor-patient relations.”). In INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 136 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), supra note 4,
Jessica W. Berg et al. state:
By the mid-1970s, almost all states that had considered the question had
concluded that inadequate disclosure is actionable only as professional
negligence, not battery. . . . At the same time, the administration of
therapy without any consent at all, or outside the scope of the consent
given, is still actionable as a battery in many states.
Mark A. Rothstein & Gil Siegel, Health Information Technology and Physicians’ Duty to
Notify Patients of New Medical Developments, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 121 (2012).
14
Felicity Goodyear-Smith & Stephen Buetow, Power Issues in the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 449, 450 (2001). See also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); DAVID ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE:
A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING (1991)
(noting the increasing social distance between patients and physicians). But see Ezekiel
J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship, in
READINGS IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS 12 (2002) (“Over the last few decades, the discourse
regarding the physician-patient relationship has focused on two extremes: autonomy
and paternalism. Many have attacked physicians as paternalistic urging the
empowerment of patients to control their own care.”).

KOCH(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/15/2015 5:31 PM

A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

179

allegations of unauthorized surgery during a routine examination,
Justice Cardozo stated, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable for damages.”15
Although this language appears to establish the right of informed
consent to treatment, the controversy in Schloendorff was not about the
nature or amount of information the physician communicated to the
patient as part of the patient’s consent to treatment. Instead, the case
was based on the patient’s explicit refusal to consent to a specific
surgical procedure.16 Regardless, Justice Cardozo’s famous words
represent the principal limitation on the physician-patient
relationship.
The doctrine of informed consent developed via the common law
under the rubric of negligence law, beginning in the 1950’s,17 and an
affirmative duty to disclose was first addressed in the courts in 1957.18
Particularly in the 1960’s and 1970’s, patients began asserting
increasing self-determination in their medical decision-making; this
shift away from medical paternalism and toward patient-driven
medicine has been described as “the historical transition from the
regime of ‘doctor is right’ to ‘patient has rights.’”19 Patient
15

105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
Id.; Menikoff, supra note 13, at 156. Thus, “[w]hen Cardozo talks about
performing an operation ‘without consent,’ he is not referring to a failure to
adequately explain the risks and benefits of the procedure. Rather, battery takes place
only when something happens to a patient other than what the patient expected.” Id.
In Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines, supra note 4, at 63, E. Haavi
Morreim writes:
For research undertaken during the current era of federal supervision
and mandatory informed consent, the most prevalent complaints
concern inadequate, not absent, information. If battery applies to a
complete failure to disclose, breach of informed consent would apply
when a researcher has openly invited someone to enter a research
protocol but insufficiently described its nature, uncertainties, risks or
alternatives.
17
Menikoff, supra note 13, at 157.
18
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)
(holding that physicians had a duty to disclose all facts that were necessary for the
patient to make an intelligent health care decision). Commentators have noted that
the law’s focus on “psychic integrity has existed for almost as long [as the law’s concern
for bodily integrity] and has received increasing support in this century as evidenced
by the cases recognizing causes of action in tort law for intentional, and more recently,
negligent infliction of emotional distress.” BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 43.
19
Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to “Patient
has Rights,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243 (2000). See also Azgad Gold, Physicians’ “Rights of
Conscience”–Beyond Politics, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 134, 135 (2010) (“[The doctor-patient
relationship] has changed significantly as a direct result from the rise of the informed
16
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empowerment means the ability to make fully informed decisions,
based on adequate information furnished by one’s physician, rather
than relying on one’s physician to know and decide what is best for the
patient.20 Because “courts were far more reluctant to characterize as
batteries treatments or operations that were performed with the
patient’s consent but without an adequate disclosure by the surgeon of
the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the agreed upon procedure,”21
they turned to the doctrine of informed consent to remedy such
harms.22
As a result, in order to ensure that the patient receives sufficient
information with which to make a decision to undergo a specific
treatment, courts turned to a negligence theory premised on the
doctrine of informed consent.23 Under this cause of action, failure to
disclose the risks of an intervention may allow an individual to recover
for harm arising from nondisclosure of information material to the
individual’s decision to agree to the intervention. In other words, a
patient may claim lack of informed consent when she consented to the
intervention itself but disclosure of the risks was insufficient. Thus, by
allowing patients to recover for lack of informed consent—rather than
just consent—courts have attempted to fill an important gap.24
Today, all United States jurisdictions have adopted some form of
the doctrine of informed consent either by statutory enactment or
judicial decision.25 Until 1972, the question of the legal adequacy of a
consent doctrine whose goals were the ‘protection of patient or subject welfare and
the promotion of autonomy.’”). Gold identifies the legal transition to the doctorpatient relationship in the past four decades, in which “the informed consent process
was established as a legal standard of care which enabled the patient to act as an
autonomous ‘persona,’ according to her own wishes and values.” Id. See also Leonard
J. Long, Can Health Care Conscientious Objectors Thread the Needle?, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 51, 67–68 (2009).
20
Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
313, 318 (2002).
21
Id. at 319.
22
Although it is true that patients now have much more access to information “on
the Internet, commercials, and television medical dramas,” concern still exists about
the quality of this information. Long, supra note 19, at 67–68. Thus, information
furnished from one’s own physician is likely to be the most accurate, personal, and
reliable.
23
BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 134.
24
The court in Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 439 (Ariz.
2003) addressed the distinction between lack of “consent” and lack of “informed
consent,” noting that “‘lack of informed consent,’ . . . should be pled in negligence,
and ‘lack of consent,’ should be pled in battery.” See also Menikoff, supra note 13, at
156–57.
25
BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 42–43. Most informed consent statutes were
enacted after 1975. In general, jurisdictions where the doctrine of informed consent
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patient’s consent to medical treatment was most often raised when
there were allegations that the consent was vitiated by the kind of
medical treatment provided. Consent was invalid if a patient was not
told that the procedure consented to was radically experimental or if
the common presumptions of patient and physician were contradicted
by the facts.26 Thus, before 1972, consent was generally legally
adequate as long as the patient had notice of the nature and scope of
the proposed medical intervention: what the physician proposed and
its probable result. The change was first announced in the cases
Canterbury v. Spence27 and Cobbs v. Grant,28 in which both courts imposed
a duty on the physician to tell the patient of the potential risks and
benefits of the proposed treatment, the potential risks and benefits of
alternative treatments, and the risks involved in refusing any treatment
at all.29 The purposes behind the doctrine of informed consent are
several, and include protection of individual autonomy and dignity,
avoidance of patient fraud or duress, encouragement of physicians to
make good decisions, enablement of patient rational decision-making,
and involvement of the public in medicine, via a policy of shared
decision-making.
A claim of lack of informed consent requires the same elements
required to establish a traditional negligence claim: (1) a duty of care
owed by the defendant to use reasonable care to prevent harm to the
plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) harm or injury to the plaintiff,
and (4) a causal link between the injury and the breach of duty.30 At
the heart of this Article is the first element: the duty owed to the
individual who is harmed due to the physical intervention. The
traditional negligence requirements include an established physicianpatient relationship, which imposes a physician duty of care. Such a
relationship is sometimes characterized as a contractual one31 in which
has been introduced by common law decision have more extensive requirements
concerning patient information and participation.
26
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
27
Id.
28
8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972) (holding that a physician is under a duty to disclose to a
patient those risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, alternative treatments, and
of no treatment, which a hypothetical reasonable patient would consider material).
29
BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 136–37.
30
BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 133–34; Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H.
Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for
Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 109 (2002); but see Susan M. Wolf,
Jordan Paradise & Charlisse Caga-Anan, The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361 (2008).
31
Richard Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. BAR FOUND. J.
87, 127 (1976) (“The root problem with the informed consent doctrine is that it is
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the patient knowingly and voluntarily seeks the professional assistance
of the physician, thereby initiating the relationship, and the physician
knowingly agrees to treat the patient.32 The physician’s goal in the
relationship is to benefit the patient, either through treatment or
preventative care. To demonstrate the existence of a doctor-patient
relationship, courts typically require: (1) a direct connection between
the doctor and patient, (2) that the patient sought care from the
doctor, (3) the doctor’s consent to render advice, and (4) the patient’s
reliance on the doctor’s care.33 A patient may not recover for lack of
informed consent for nondisclosure of the risks of a proposed
treatment if there is no doctor-patient relationship. The doctorpatient relationship is essential to a claim for failure to provide
informed consent because of the inherent information disparity: the
patient lacks the professional knowledge of the physician and is the
one at risk of injury, illness, and death.34 The professional can inform
or advise the patient about the medical risks and benefits of an
intervention.
Under the doctrine of informed consent, the physician must
disclose the risks of the intervention and obtain consent before
initiating treatment.35 Thus, it focuses primarily on the duty of the
physician to disclose information to the patient, and secondarily on the
patient’s consent. An individual claiming lack of informed consent
must demonstrate that the physician failed to disclose information
material to his or her decision to consent to a particular intervention.
Only half of American jurisdictions accept the core principle
enunciated in Canterbury v. Spence that the patient’s need for
information to effectuate self-determination requires a standard of
disclosure established by law (the reasonable patient standard), rather
than professional custom (what a reasonable physician concludes a

forever at war with the mutual expectations of the parties.”).
32
Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emerg. Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn.
2004); Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 352 Or. 267 (2012); Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291,
293 (5th Cir. 1990). See also M Shultz, supra note 12, at 223–24 (1985). This
contractual relationship may either be express or implied. Similarly, it has been held
that a consent form in a research protocol formed a unilateral contract. See Dahl v.
Hem Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993).
33
See, e.g., Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974); Kundert v. Il.
Valley Comm. Hosp., 964 N.E. 2d 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Reynolds v. Decatur Mem.
Hosp., 277 Ill. App. 3d 80 (1996) (holding that there was no physician-patient
relationship between a doctor who gave an informal opinion over the telephone at the
request of the treating physician and a minor patient whose case was discussed, and
thus the doctor did not owe duty of care to patient).
34
See generally Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974).
35
BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 141.
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patient ought to know).36 In other words, half of the states use the
“reasonable patient” standard of Canterbury,37 while half use
“professional” standard (like that employed in other medical
malpractice cases).
Decisions addressing informed consent arising in the treatment
context have also been premised on the physician’s fiduciary duty to
her patient.38 A fiduciary duty claim, or one that is based on an
individual’s obligation to act for another’s benefit, requires that the
patient show that (1) had he known of a certain risk, he would have
behaved different; and (2) another approach would have resulted in a
different outcome. However, generally, “the standard physicianpatient relationship is not always deemed fiduciary in the most classic
sense.”39
B. Informed Consent to Research
Unsurprisingly, the focus on the doctrine of informed consent
came to the forefront in the research context at the same time as it did
in the treatment context. However, research participants who are
harmed in the course of medical research rarely have a right to recover
for lack of informed consent. The law as it relates to the failure of
investigators to disclose risks in the research context developed
statutorily, rather than judicially.40 This fundamental distinction in the
doctrine of informed consent between treatment and research is
central to the absence of judicial recourse for research participants
who are harmed as a result of investigators’ failure to disclose the risks
of research.
The modern history of human subjects research can be traced
back to the Nazi experiments during World War II and the Nuremberg
War Crimes Trials against twenty-three doctors who had performed
medical experiments without the subjects’—prisoners of war and
36

David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two
Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risk, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103 (2007).
37
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38
Shea v. Esenstein, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). However, in Neade v. Portes, 193
Ill. 2d 433 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the use of fiduciary theories to
protect patients from risks created by provider’s third party financial arrangements,
like managed care organizations.
39
Morreim, supra note 4, at 4 (citing J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 29
(1981) (discussing the historical shift away from holding doctor-patient relationship
to be fiduciary because of the doctor’s superior education)).
40
BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 258 (“The very fact that consent to treatment has
been left to judicial control, while consent to research is regulated by administrative
bodies, points to a fundamental distinctions between the treatment and research
processes.”).
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civilians of occupied countries—consent.
The resulting 1947
Nuremberg Code, authored by the expert witnesses and judges in the
“Doctors Trial,” is a set of research ethics principles for human
experimentation and emphasizes the principles of autonomy and
respect for persons.41 However, since then, the U.S. has had its own
major research scandals. In one of the most notorious studies, United
States Public Health Service researchers investigating the progression
of syphilis failed to treat participants or inform them of available
treatments, even after penicillin became widely available for
treatment.42 From 1932 to 1972, nearly 400 impoverished African
Americans were included in the study, many of whom died of syphilis
or syphilis-related conditions. The experiment, which became known
as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, persists as an infamous example of nonconsensual, harmful research.43
In light of the revelation of scandals such as the Tuskegee Syphilis
study and those revealed by Henry Beecher’s groundbreaking 1966
article in the New England Journal of Medicine,44 lawmakers at both
the federal and state levels have attempted to create oversight
mechanisms for human subjects research, with the goal of protecting
the rights of participants from harmful, unethical research. These laws
and regulations focus on voluntary informed consent and oversight to
protect research participants from abuse. In 1974, Congress passed
the National Research Act, which created the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral

41

See Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10 (1949) available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/
nurcode.html.
42
Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study Legacy Committee – May 20, 1996, http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/badblood/
report/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
43
Id.
44
Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 367, 371
(1966), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/documents/BeecherArticle.pdf. In one
example, the Willowbrook State School, a New York residential institution for
developmentally disabled persons, asked parents to give “consent” for the deliberate
infection of their children with hepatitis, although the risks to the children were not
disclosed. Some of the children were then treated with immunoglobulins in an
attempt to diminish the effect of the disease, while others served as control subjects.
In some cases, children waiting for admission to the institution gained entry when
parents agreed to enroll their child in the study since the only available rooms were in
the experimental ward. In another instance cited in the article, researchers from
Memorial Sloan-Kettering injected cancer cells into twenty-two institutionalized
elderly patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. Patients were not informed
that they were exposed to cancer but were told only that they would receive “some
cells.” Id. at 371.
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Research (“National Commission”).45 One of the responsibilities of the
National Commission was to identify the ethical principles that should
be the foundation of human subjects research and to develop
guidelines to assure that such research is conducted in accordance
with those principles.
The National Commission’s 1978 report, also known as the
Belmont Report, enunciated three ethical values by which research
involving human subjects should be conducted: respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice.46 The first of these values, respect for
persons, addresses the primary ethical imperative that individuals
should be respected as autonomous agents.47 An autonomous
individual can consider and act upon personal goals, and to respect an
autonomous individual is to accept his opinions and decisions—so
long as these actions do not harm others. The value of respect for
persons encourages potential participants to be involved in the
decision-making process, assuring them that they have an essential role
in the research and that their opinions and decisions are valued. It
also reminds investigators that all participants should be treated with
dignity and respect, and that they are not merely objects to be used for
the purpose of research.
In turn, the Belmont Report became the basis for much of the
federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations, including the Common Rule, which now govern the
majority of human subjects research in the country.48 With its focus on
45

THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/policy/belmont.html.
46
Id.
47
The original Belmont Report detailed the value of autonomy thusly:
An autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation.
To respect autonomy is to give weight to an autonomous person’s
considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their
actions unless they are clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of
respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that person’s
considered judgments or to withhold information necessary to make a
considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so.
Id.
48
45 C.F.R 46 (Subpart A) (2014). The Common Rule (formally “The Federal
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects”) has been adopted by eighteen federal
government agencies to promote uniformity in the conduct of human subjects
research. Research is primarily overseen by the Office of Human Research Protections
(OHRP), an office within HHS, which ensures regulatory compliance and provides
guidance for the conduct of such research. See generally US Department of Health and
Human Services, OHRP Fact Sheet – December, 2009, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/
facts/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). Only Subpart A of 45 C.F.R. 46 (2014),
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beneficence, justice, and—most important to this discussion—
autonomy, the Common Rule applies to research that uses federal
funds, is conducted by the federal government, or is overseen by a
federal agency.49 The Common Rule and similar FDA regulations50 are
intended to protect research participants by minimizing the possibility
of coercion or undue influence by laying out the requirements for
informed consent. Among its other elements, the Common Rule
enunciates
detailed
requirements
regarding
institutions’
responsibilities to assess research protocols and for obtaining and
documenting informed consent, including disclosure of potential risks
and benefits.51
However, neither the Common Rule nor the FDA regulations—
the most significant federal regulations related to human subjects
research—provide a private right of action for participants who are
harmed as a result of investigators’ failure to disclose the risks of the
research. The lack of a private right of action for research harms can
be attributed to the absence of a recognized relationship between the
investigator and the participant. In the treatment context, the doctorpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of the physician to the patient;
breach of that duty allows the injured patient to recover for damages
in civil suit.52 Because a similar relationship does not exist between the
investigator and research participant, a researcher’s duty of informed
consent to study participants is limited. Instead, in the absence of a
therapeutic relationship, the penalty for violation of the regulations
governing human subjects research is loss of federal funding or
suspension of research.53
Historically, the relationship between the investigator and
research participant has been easily distinguishable from the
relationship between the doctor and patient. For one, to the extent
that the doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary one, the investigatorthe Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, is identified as the
Common Rule. The Common Rule is also consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki
(recommendations by the World Medical Association (WMA) for research involving
human subjects). The Declaration of Helsinki was originally adopted by the WMA in
1964, and the most recent amendments were adopted in October 2013.
49
45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2014).
50
21 C.F.R. § 50 (2014). The FDA regulations are substantially similar to the
Common Rule.
51
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116–17 (2014).
52
See supra Section I.0.
53
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Department of Health and
Human Services, OHRP’s Compliance Oversight Procedures for Evaluating Institutions (Oct.
14, 2009), available at http:// www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/ohrpcomp.pdf; 45
C.F.R. § 46.123(a) (2014); 21 C.F.R. § 56.121 (2014).
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research participant relationship is not.54 In the treatment context, a
physician has a direct obligation to provide care to the patient, with
the purpose of preserving or improving her health. This purpose lends
itself to an expectation of trust and confidence upon which a fiduciary
relationship may be based. In contrast, the investigator’s interaction
with a study’s participant is for the advancement of generalized
knowledge—and not the direct (or even often indirect) benefit to the
research participant.55 Thus, “a completely different allegiance
permeates the relationship. The investigator’s entire purpose, his
number one loyalty, is already pegged on something other than the
patient. It is to the protocol.”56
Although lawsuits based on failure of informed consent against
investigators have increased in the last few decades,57 those courts that
54

Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines, supra note 4,
at 45; Elizabeth R. Pike, Karen Rothenberg & Benjamin E. Berkman, Finding Fault?:
Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings in Genomic Research. 102 GEO. L.J. 795,
818 (2014) (“But researchers qua researchers are not generally thought to owe
fiduciary duties, despite often having similar knowledge, skills, and abilities . . . .
Researchers, therefore, owe participants something less than a fiduciary duty.”).
55
Coleman, supra note 3; BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 281; Matthew Gordon, A
Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings To Research Subjects?, 64 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 225 (2009). Gordon notes that the traditional approach is beginning to break
down: “The traditional rule regarding third-party examinations is changing, however,
and with it the implications for researchers’ disclosure duties to their subjects. In a
number of jurisdictions, courts have been unwilling to rigidly apply the formal
requirements of a physician-patient relationship when faced with preventable harm.”
Id. at 238. See also Morreim, supra note 4, at 45.
56
Morreim, supra note 4, at 45. See also PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 91 (“Whereas clinicians have strong fiduciary duties
to act in the best interests of patients, researchers have obligations to their participants
and to society. Both society at large and participants engaged in research have a vested
interest in completed research that furthers scientific knowledge.”); Pike, supra note
4, at 12 ([T]rust and dependency are “not the cornerstone of the researcherparticipant relationship.”).
57
See, e.g., Mello, Studdert & Brennan, supra note 4, at 40; Morreim, supra note 4,
at 4; Alice Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical Research—Patient Safeguards, Oversight Key
Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1. The case of Jesse Gelsinger exemplifies
what some commentators have noted to be a proliferation of (often unsuccessful) tort
litigation against researchers. An eighteen-year old volunteer with ornithine
transcarbamylase deficiency died during his participation in a gene transfer study at
the University of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit brought by his father against the university
and investigators alleged that the investigators committed fraud by not revealing that
a co-investigator, the university, and other university officials had financial
relationships with Genovo, a biotechnology company, and stood to gain financially
from the successful use of RDAd vectors. Complaint, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ.
of Pa. (2000), http://www.sskrplaw.com/files/gelsinger_complaint.pdf.
The
complaint also alleged that the investigators had failed to inform Jesse of the risks of
the study, that they had failed to inform Jesse or the FDA of adverse events experienced
by other participants in the same trial as well as the death of monkeys in an earlier
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have attempted to establish a private cause of action for failure to
provide informed consent in research have rarely—if ever—been
successful.58 Because of the absence of a duty of care premised on a
recognized relationship between investigators and research
participants in the current rules governing human subjects research,
courts are generally reluctant to recognize a duty-conferring
relationship between the investigator and research participant.59 In
most instances where courts have found a duty-conferring relationship
in the research context, they have done so based on a preexisting
doctor-patient interaction, such that the physician serves a dual role
(as does the patient). For example, in Darke v. Isner, the Massachusetts
Superior Court held that the state common law was broad enough to
impose tort liability on a doctor who failed to disclose his financial
interest in the treatment he recommended.60 Roger Darke, a
participant in an experimental gene therapy program conducted by
Dr. Jeffrey Isner, chief of cardiovascular research at St. Elizabeth’s
Medical Center in Boston, died twenty-four hours after undergoing
surgery in which Isner administered a gene therapy.61 Darke’s widow
sued the hospital and doctors, alleging that, had Darke known that a
previous patient had died in the program and that Isner had financial
interests in the success of the gene therapy program, Darke would not

animal study, and that the investigators had allowed Jesse to participate in the study
despite not meeting its inclusion criteria due to the fact that his liver was not
functioning within the study’s 24-hour limit. Jesse Gelsinger’s father learned that a
“principal investigator, James Wilson, owned stock in . . . [the] company [he had]
founded, which contributed $4 million per year to human gene therapy research at
the University . . . where the experiment took place,” and claimed that had Gelsinger
known about these financial interests, “he would not have [participated] in the
research study.” David Resnik, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest to Research Subjects: An Ethical
and Legal Analysis, 11 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 141, 142 (2004). The suit ended in
a confidential settlement in 2000.
58
Federal courts have generally rejected a private right of action. See Robertson
v. McGee, 2002 WL 535045, at *3 (N.D. Okla. 2002); Robinett v. U.S., 62 F.3d 1433, at
1 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Washington v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1000 (E.D. M.O.
2006). A Pennsylvania court has found that a hospital could be held liable for failure
to obtain informed consent in experimental studies pursuant to FDA regulations.
Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa. Super. 622 (1992). The court, however, appears to
conflate the patient’s and the research participant’s rights to informed consent, noting
that the plaintiff had been a patient of the hospital and “was never informed, prior to
surgery, that he was about to become a participant in a clinical investigation.” Id. at
624. The court held that the unconsented-to operation was a non-consensual
touching, “thus giving rise to an action for a ‘technical’ battery.” Id. at 627.
59
Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30, at 368 (citing Wright v. Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wa. 2002)).
60
Darke v. Isner, 20 Mass. L. Rep. 419 (Mass Super. Ct. 2005).
61
Id.
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have participated.62 At the time the suit was filed, Isner and his heirs
owned 20 percent of Vascular Genetics, which Isner helped found in
1997 to support the experimental gene therapy treatment for coronary
artery disease that he developed (the defendant hospital also owned
20 percent). The complaint alleged that Darke “was intentionally and
maliciously treated as a human guinea pig in order to generate great
financial profits for all defendants.”63
The trial court held that the doctor and hospital could be held
liable for failing to disclose, as part of the informed consent process,
their financial interests in the treatment that they recommended.64
The court repeatedly refers to Isner as Darke’s “doctor” and relies on
the reasoning that supports the duty of care (and the associated duty
to disclose financial conflicts of interest) based on a medical physicianpatient relationship.65 Again, the next year, the same court held that
enough evidence had been presented to support the allegation that
the doctor’s financial stake in the success of the gene therapy
treatment may have compromised how the clinical trial was conducted,
and that enough evidence was presented to demonstrate the existence
of a doctor-patient relationship between Darke and Isner.66 It also held
that the hospital and doctor failed to disclose the financial
relationships to Darke and his wife. Despite all of this, the jury
ultimately found for the defendants.
Courts have also generally refused to find that the federal rules
and regulations governing informed consent in research give rise to a
private right of action for research participants. For example, in Wright
v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, family members of cancer
patients who had participated in a clinical trial sued the Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (the Hutch) and its investigators
in an attempt to enforce the Common Rule, Nuremberg Code, and
Declaration of Helsinki.67 The clinical trial tested use of a monoclonal
antibody to reduce the risk of graft-versus-host disease in bone marrow
transplant recipients. The antibody caused graft rejections, cancer
62

Complaint, Darke v. Isner, No. 02-2194-E (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2002).
Id.
64
Darke v. Isner, 17 Mass.L. Rep. 689 (Mass Super. Ct. 2004).
65
The court only once refers to “research,” in relying on “various guidelines
promulgated by professional medical organizations as well as by the federal
government” to support a requirement of consent forms in research. However, the
court continues to inappropriately conflate treatment and research, explaining that
these guidelines and the Common Rule “indicate a trend towards requiring physicians
to disclose non-medical information to the patient.” Id.
66
Darke v. Isner, 20 Mass. L. Rep. 419 (Mass Super. Ct. 2005).
67
269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
63
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relapses, and new cancers, which the plaintiffs alleged caused
premature death in some trial participants. The Seattle Times exposed
that the Hutch had licensed the commercial rights to the antibody
being studied to a start-up company called Genetic Systems but
retained a royalty interest and held stock in the company.68 In
addition, one of the investigators had a seat on the Genetic Systems’
scientific advisory board, another was employed as the company’s
medical director in addition to working for the Hutch, and the third
was a consultant to the company. The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants failed to disclose the risks of trial participation and the
financial interests of the Hutch and investigators involved in the study
violated the rights of trial participants. The trial court disagreed,
holding that withholding information did not violate the trial
participants’ rights.69 It also rejected a claim brought under the Civil
Rights Act to enforce the federal regulations, holding that the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not create or imply a private
right of action.70 The court reasoned that regulations promulgated by
an agency cannot give rise to a private cause of action if the authorizing
statute does not confer that right.
Further, even where courts have found a relationship between the
investigator and research participant, they have often been unable to
find adequate materiality or causation to support a private right of
action for informed consent in research.71 In the research context, it
is particularly difficult to show that individuals would not have
participated in a research protocol had they known of certain risks.
Often, participation in a study is an individual’s final option, after she
has exhausted all of the treatment alternatives. In Wright v. Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, the court did allow the informed
consent claim to proceed to trial.72 However, the jury found for the
Hutch and investigators, concluding that the participants had given
68

Duff Wilson & David Heath, Patients Never Knew They the Full Danger of Trials They
Staked Their Lives on, SEATTLE TIMES (2001), available at http://seattletimes.com/
uninformed_consent/bloodcancer/story1.html.
69
Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286
(W.D. Wash. 2002).
70
Id. (relying on Robertson v. McGee, No. 01CV60, 2002 WL 535045, at *3 (N.D.
Okla. Jan. 28, 2002); Robinett v. United States, 62 F.3d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
71
Lori A. Alvino, Who’s Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research
Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 910 (2003) (“In all cases the injured
plaintiff would have to prove the basic elements of a negligence cause of action . . . .
Depending on the situation, injured research subjects could have a great deal of
difficulty proving any one of these elements.”).
72
Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286
(W.D. Wash. 2002).
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their consent and that a reasonably prudent fully informed person in
their position would have made the choice to participate in the clinical
trial.73
In contrast to Wright, Whitlock v. Duke University represents one of
the few cases where a court has held that the Common Rule established
the standard of care for an informed consent claim against
investigators where there was no preexisting medical relationship
between the researcher and participant.74 The court attempted to
distinguish research from treatment and imposed a researcher
standard of care on the investigator.75 The participant, Leonard
Whitlock, participated in a simulated deep dive experiment to study
high pressure nervous syndrome, as a result of which he suffered
permanent organic brain damage. Among other claims, Whitlock
alleged that Duke University negligently failed to warn Whitlock of the
risk of organic brain damage. Although the court explained that “the
degree of required disclosure of risks is higher in the nontherapeutic
context” than in the nonexperimental therapeutic context controlled
by the state statute at issue, it held that there was no genuine issue of
fact regarding whether the risk of organic brain damage unique to
experimental deep diving was a reasonably foreseeable risk.76 It
therefore granted summary judgment to Duke University on the
negligence issue and did not reach the issue of whether a private cause
of action in favor of a research subject arises from the Common Rule.77
Where courts have found that participants can bring a claim for
lack of informed consent in the research context, they have primarily
done so in cases involving particular populations or where (like in
Whitlock) the investigator has neglected to disclose information about
his research or economic interests that may affect his professional
73

Id.
637 F. Supp. 1463, 1475 (M.D.N.C. 1986). See also Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913
P.2d 779 (Wash. 1996) (adopting the Common Rule as the standard of care for
informed consent claims).
75
Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. 1475.
76
Id. at 1471. See also Anna C. Mastroianni, Liability, Regulation and Policy in Surgical
Innovation: The Cutting Edge of Research and Therapy, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 420 (2006)
(“[A] higher standard of disclosure would appear to apply to research than to medical
practice.”).
77
Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1475. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987). One commentator argues that
the court failed to distinguish clinical innovation (a genre of medical practice) from
research, the latter requires “a scientific protocol toward gaining generalizable
knowledge.” Morreim, supra note 4, at 27 (stating that “although the court ostensibly
distinguishes between medical treatment and research, its decision was based on an
important confusion” between research and medical innovation in the precedent
upon which the court relied).
74
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judgment.78 Despite courts’ inability or unwillingness to recognize a
private right of action for informed consent in the research context, the
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute decision is frequently cited as evidence
that courts are beginning to recognize the existence of a duty and
standard of care arising out of the “special relationship” between
investigators and research participants established by the Common
Rule. The Kennedy Krieger Institute, a research institute associated
with Johns Hopkins, conducted a non-therapeutic research program
testing the effectiveness of varying degrees of lead paint abatement in
housing inhabited by young children.79 With funding from the
Environmental Protection Agency, it studied the blood lead levels
found in children who lived in remediated, partially remediated, and
“modern” housing in the Baltimore area. Thus, the study “required
certain classes of homes to have only partial lead paint abatement
modifications performed . . . [and] encouraged, and in at least one of
the cases . . . required, the landlords to rent the premises to families
with young children.”80
The trial court found for the investigators, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals reversed.81 The Court of Appeals held that the
Common Rule’s informed consent requirements create a duty of care
arising out of a “special relationship” between the investigator and
research participant, a breach of which was actionable under state law.
The court held that the research consent form specifically created a
contract and that the consent form was inadequate.82 Thus, the
protocol lacked fully informed consent as required by the federal
regulations. The court stated that the standard for disclosure is
whether a reasonably prudent fully informed person would have
decided to participate in the research. The participant (or his
surrogate) is entitled to disclosure of all “reasonably foreseeable” risks
of the research. The court predicated its decision on the establishment
of a so-called “special relationship” between the investigator and the
research participant, which can give rise to duties for both the
investigator and the research participant or surrogate, even where the
investigator is not the research subject’s physician (and therefore no
doctor-patient relationship exists). Instead, the duty of care arises out
of the investigator-subject relationship, and because the investigators
78

See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
80
Id. at 811–12.
81
Id.
82
“The very nature of nontherapeutic research on human subjects can, and
normally will, create special relationships out of which duties arise.” Id. at 834–35.
79
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waited nine months to disclose “hot spots” of high lead exposure to
parents (after the child’s blood was found to contain elevated levels of
lead), they breached the duty to disclose complete and accurate
information.
The Grimes court makes a particularly concerted effort to find the
existence of a “special relationship” that gives rise to duties. However,
the decision indicates that such a finding may be constrained to
particularly circumscribed conditions.83 For example, the court was
willing to find the existence of an investigator-participant relationship
because the facts in that case involved (1) surrogate consent to
research, which offered (2) no prospect of direct benefit to the
research participants (in other words, the research protocol was
nontherapeutic), but presented (3) more than a minor increase over
minimal risk to the (4) otherwise healthy participants.84 Thus, a court
may be more likely to determine that a “special relationship” exists
where investigators recruit otherwise healthy individuals, “especially
children whose consent is furnished indirectly, to participate in
nontherapeutic procedures that are potentially hazardous, dangerous,
or deleterious to their health.”85 Significantly, no other court has
found such a “special relationship” between investigators and research
participants, and it would be presumptuous to assume, based on this
single court’s narrow holding, a general private right of action for
participants for failure to disclose the risks and benefits of a research
protocol.86
II. THE EVOLVING RESEARCH MODEL AND THE SHIFTING
INVESTIGATOR-PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP
The practice of medicine has changed dramatically in the last four
decades, arguably blurring the line between research and treatment.87
The doctor-patient relationship is itself transforming, becoming less
permanent and more impersonal—much like the traditional
investigator-participant relationship. For example, patients often rely
on multiple specialists (for finite amounts of time each) rather than a
single generalist over the course of their lifetime, thereby contributing
to less lasting relationships. This may signal a “knowledge transition”
in the conventional practice of medicine, where “the growth of
83

The court makes clear that whether such a relationship exists should be
determined on a “case by case” basis. Id. at 858.
84
Id. at 846.
85
Grimes, 782 A.2d 807, 845–46.
86
See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 30; Alvino, supra note 71, at 910.
87
Gold, supra note 19, at 135.
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medical knowledge caused a shift from a treatment that is provided by
one (familiar) physician to a treatment provided by several (unknown)
specialists and sub-specialists.”88 Further, the provision of care
increasingly involves more advanced technology, signaling a
“technological transition,” in which “advanced technological
equipment became an integral and prominent component of medical
evaluation and treatment.”89 The “structural transition” in the
conventional practice of medicine is exacerbated by the increasing
role of insurance companies or hospitals.90 Moreover, the information
disparity traditionally present in the doctor-patient relationship
continues to dissipate. Thus, the doctor-patient relationship is
becoming more like that of the investigator-patient: more transitory,
impersonal, and indirect.
Maintaining the distinction between the duties owed to patients
and duties owed to research participants may become even less
sustainable as the distinctions between treatment and research
continue to diminish. Research participants are often subject to the
same procedures and risks as patients (but frequently are not
presented with the attendant potential benefits of an intervention).
Further, calls for similar approaches to both of these relationships—
including compensation for injured patients and participants—often
hinge on the comparable information disequilibrium that exist in
each. The Grimes court noted disparate knowledge levels between
investigators and subjects in the research context, explaining that the
“special relationship” between investigators and research participants
“arise because, generally, the investigators are in a better position to
anticipate, discover, and understand the potential risks to the health
of their subjects. Practical inequalities exist between researchers, who
have superior knowledge, and participants ‘who are often poorly
placed to protect themselves from risk.’”91

88

Gold, supra note 19, at 135.
Gold, supra note 19, at 135.
90
Gold, supra note 19, at 135. The author notes a fourth transition in the practice
of medicine that is less relevant to this analysis, the epidemiological transition, where
“the overall prevalence and lethality of infectious diseases has been reduced
significantly while there has been a relative rise in the overall prevalence of chronic
and degenerative conditions.” Gold, supra note 19, at 135.
91
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001) (citation
omitted).
89
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The fact that consent to the treatment is left to judicial control,
while consent to the research is left to statutory and regulatory control,
may reflect the traditional distinction between treatment and
research.92 However, at the same time as the physician-patient
relationship has become less permanent and personal, the typical
research model has evolved since the most notable court efforts to find
a duty of care, premised on a special relationship93—thereby making
the line between treatment and research less well-defined. In turn,
courts may be less able to rely on the distinction between treatment
and research goals as a justification for different standards for recovery
for nondisclosure of material information. In fact, there is evidence
that courts have begun to recognize the artificiality of the distinction
between treatment and research.94 For example, in 1976—two years
after the passage of the National Research Act—a federal appeals court
applying New Mexico law addressed the increasingly unclear line
between treatment and experimental procedures.95 In Ahern v. Veterans
Administration, a patient brought a medical malpractice action against
the Veterans Administration (VA) for negligently administering
excessive amounts of radiation in the treatment of a cancerous tumor.96
The chief of surgical services at the VA testified that no medical
research supported deviating from the standard of care.97 The
plaintiff’s physician similarly testified that, in his opinion,
administering the dosage of radiation was “experimental.”98 Focusing
on the “experimental nature” of the intervention, the court held that,
“in order for a physician to avoid liability by engaging in drastic or
experimental treatment, which exceeds the bounds of established
medical standards, his patient must always be fully informed of the
92

BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 259.
Grimes, 782 A.2d 807 .
94
However, not all scholars agree that research and treatment are similar enough
to warrant this possible conflation. See Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The
Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomic Research, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 473 (2012).
Others maintain that the obligations of researchers must be different from those of
treating physicians. Coleman, supra note 3, at 403 (recommending reliance on
fiduciary law as a model for the researcher-subject relationship); Henry S. Richardson
& Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers: An Ethical
Framework for Thinking About the Clinical Care that Researchers Owe Their Subjects, 34
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 25 (2004) (“Researchers do not owe their subjects the same
level of care that physicians owe patients, but they owe more than merely what the
research protocol stipulates. In keeping with the dynamics of the relationship between
researcher and subject, they have limited but substantive fiduciary obligations.”).
95
Ahern v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1976).
96
Id. at 1099.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1101.
93
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experimental nature of the treatment and of the foreseeable
consequences of that treatment.”99
Moreover, the oft-cited case Moore v. Regents of the University of
California highlights the increasingly blurred line between the
treatment and research relationships.100 The Supreme Court of
California held that a patient with hairy cell leukemia had a cause of
action based on his physician’s failure to disclose his intent to use
portions of the plaintiff’s spleen in research for which the physician
hoped to benefit financially.101 The court then remanded the case for
trial on the grounds that the patient, Moore, had alleged a valid cause
of action because Golde, Moore’s physician, did not disclose facts
“material to the patient’s consent.”102 Failure to disclose such interests
may “give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures
without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.”103 Moore’s
physicians represented that the taking of Moore’s cells was solely or
primarily for research rather than for therapeutic purposes. Moore
alleged that his physician concealed his nontherapeutic interests,
telling Moore that the takings were required for Moore’s health and
well-being and denying any commercial or financial interest in the
cells.104 The court decided that the physician had an obligation to
disclose the research and economic purposes of the tissue he extracted
during the splenectomy, which would be material to the patient’s
decision to undergo treatment.105 The court therefore held that a
99

Id. at 1102 (emphasis added).
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990). But see
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (noting that “since the law regarding a duty of informed consent for
research subjects is unsettled and fact-specific . . . , the Court finds that in certain
circumstances a medical researcher does have a duty of informed consent[,]” but
declining to extend the duty to disclose economic interests where a researcher is not
in a therapeutic relationship with the patient). The court in Greenberg found that Moore
was “clearly distinguishable” because of this lack of clinical dependence between the
parties. Id. Further, although the court in Greenberg noted in dicta that a duty may
attach at some point in the investigator-participant relationship, the duty of informed
consent in medical research has not been extended to disclosure of a researcher’s
economic interests. Id.
101
Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
102
Id. at 484.
103
Id. at 483.
104
Id. at 481.
105
Id. at 484. Some commentators have described the problematic nature of
conflating research and treatment in this case, noting that “the medically pointless
tissue removals could not have been malpractice because they were not medical
practice at all . . . [because] medical treatment aims ‘to benefit or cure the patient.’”
Morreim, supra note 4, at 22 (quoting Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 786,
796 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)).
100
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physician who used a patient’s surgically removed spleen to establish a
patented cell line should have disclosed his research and economic
interests to the patient prior to the intervention.106 This case highlights
the lack of clarity regarding where treatment ends and research begins
and is often relied upon to support the argument that the physicianpatient relationship and investigator-participant relationship should
be treated similarly.
Indeed, allowing harmed research participants the opportunity to
recover might be even more necessary in the research context than in
the treatment setting because of the greater probability of conflicting
or diverging goals between investigator and research participant.107 In
fact, in addition to the knowledge gap between investigators and
participants, this “misalignment of interests” was one of the theories
upon which the Grimes court based its decision.108
III. AN OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE RESEARCH FINDINGS MAY FURTHER
TRANSFORM THE INVESTIGATOR-PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP
As technology advances, the discovery of “research findings”109—
incidental or secondary findings (results that arise that are outside the
purpose of the research protocol110)—or other information that could
affect the research participant’s health or decision-making will become
more likely and frequent. The proliferation of research protocols
involving genetic and biological samples111 or medical imaging will
result in a wide range of potential research findings.112 For example,
the use of whole genome or exome sequencing “by nature produces
incidental genomic findings, i.e., findings that have potential health or
reproductive importance discovered in the course of conducting
research but beyond the aims of the study.”113 In turn, an expectation
that such research results should be returned to research participants
may transform the investigator-participant relationship, giving rise to
106

Id.
Id. at 16–17; BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 281; see also Pike, supra note 4.
108
Stephanie A. Alessi, The Return of Results in Genetic Testing: Who Owes What to
Whom, When, and Why?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1697, 1715 (2013).
109
Eckstein, Garrett & Berkman, supra note 8, at 190.
110
Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:
Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 219 (2008).
111
Rafael Dal-Ré et al., Managing Incidental Genomic Findings in Clinical Trials:
Fulfillment of the Principle of Justice, 11 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2014) (“Increasingly, clinical
trials to develop new drugs and biologics involve whole genome or exome sequencing
(WGS/ WES), including for biomarker characterization, for identification of genomic
risk factors, and for population-based research.”).
112
Pike, Rothenberg & Berkman, supra note 54.
113
Rafael Dal-Ré et al., supra note 111, at 1.
107
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an obligation to disclose research findings. Eventually, this may open
the door for a private right of action for failure to disclose the risks of
a study.114 Thus, the emerging duty of investigators to participants—a
duty that may not have been as explicitly recognized in the past—may
signify a new approach to how the law should approach the
investigator-participant relationship. This section will explore the
emerging ethical (and perhaps, legal) obligation to disclose research
findings and how it will impact the investigator-participant
relationship.
Whether there is an ethical duty to disclose the results of research
to individual participants—whether or not the results are directly
related to the central research inquiry—has become a central question
in human subjects research.115 In fact, in the last decade and a half,
disclosure of research findings has been increasingly called for among
scholars and research participants.116 This is particularly true in
genetics research.117 For example, a 2009 survey found that 90 percent
of 343 genetic researchers agreed that they had a duty to offer subjects
aggregate research results.118 And a 2013 study concluded that a
114

The reasoning in this Article is not predicated on the conclusion that there
currently is a legal duty to return research findings to study participants; I believe that
an ethical duty to disclose such findings is sufficient to demonstrate an evolving
relationship between the investigator and the research participant. However, some
scholars have begun to evaluate whether a researcher has a legal duty to return
incidental findings. Pike, Rothenberg, & Berkman supra note 54, at 798 find:
Although there is no law or case law directly on point . . . there is a small
possibility that a failure to appropriately return [incidental findings]
could result in legal liability under law as it stands today. Furthermore,
there is a greater likelihood of legal liability as scholars and researchers
continue to advocate for an ethical obligation, particularly if returning
[incidental findings] becomes widespread practice.
115
Rosario Isasi et al., Disclosure and Management of Research Findings in Stem Cell
Research and Banking: Policy Statement, 7 REGEN. MED. 439 (2012); Dal-Ré et al., supra
note 111.
116
Ann H. Partridge & Eric P. Winer, Informing Clinical Trial Participants About Study
Results, 288 JAMA 363 (2002); Conrad Fernandez, Eric Kodish, & Charles Weijer,
Informing Study Participants of Research Results: An Ethical Imperative, 25 IRB: ETHICS &
HUMAN RESEARCH 12 (2003); David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller, Disclosing
Individual Results of Clinical Research, 294(6) JAMA 737 (2005). However, some scholars
have expressed concern about the increasing expectation that such information be
returned to research participants. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 473.
117
See Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental
Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENET. MED. 565 (2013).
118
Fiona Alice Miller et al., What Does “Respect for Persons” Require? Attitudes and
Reported Practices of Genetics Researchers in Informing Research Participants about Research, 38
J. MED. ETHICS 48, 48 (2012). Despite the apparent widespread acknowledgment of a
duty to return aggregate results, “return of aggregate results is still an uncommon
practice in the United States.” Lynn G. Dressler, Disclosure of Research Results from Cancer
Genomic Studies: State of the Science, 15 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 4270 (2009). See also
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majority of researchers believe that research participants should have
the option to receive at least some incidental genetic research results.119
The ethical implications of requiring disclosure of research findings
may be intensified as the discovery of clinically relevant and
scientifically valid information becomes more frequent and donors
increasingly express a desire to receive these findings.120
The transformation in the duty to disclose incidental or secondary
findings is manifest in the evolution of national bioethics advisory body
recommendations on the subject. In 1999, the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (NBAC) under President Clinton stated that
disclosure of individual research participants’ results “represents an
exceptional circumstance” and recommended return of research
findings only under narrowly specified conditions.121 As evidence of
changing perspectives, in December 2013, the Presidential
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues released its report,
which enunciated a series of recommendations for the management
of incidental and secondary findings in both treatment and research.122
The Presidential Commission explicitly acknowledged the fact that, in
certain circumstances, researchers may have an ethical duty to disclose
and manage incidental and secondary findings.123
Rebecca Dresser, Public Preferences and the Challenge to Genetic Research Policy, 1 J. L.
BIOSCIENCES 1 (2014).
119
See Robert Klitzman et al., Researchers’ Views on Return of Incidental Genomic
Research Results: Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 888, 888
(2013).
120
Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort Genetic
Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36 (2008); Juli Murphy Bollinger et al., Public Preferences
Regarding the Return of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a Qualitative Focus
Group Study, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 451 (2012); Nicole L. Allen et al., Biobank Participants’
Preferences for Disclosure of Genetic Research Results: Perspectives from the OurGenes,
OurHealth, OurCommunity Project, 89 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 738 (2014).
121
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), Research Involving Human
Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance (1999), at vi–vii, available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf.
122
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6.
123
Id. at 79. See also Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 473 (“There is substantial
consensus that people should be offered results that could trigger interventions that
are lifesaving or that could avert serious adverse health outcomes; there is somewhat
less consensus about whether people should be offered results that may have
reproductive implications or that could be personally meaningful.”); Catherine Gliwa
& Benjamin E. Berkman, Do Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic
Incidental Findings? 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32, 33 (2013) (“[O]pinion seems to be moving
toward the idea that there is some obligation to offer to disclose a limited set of
findings.”); Eckstein, Garrett & Berkman, supra note 8, at 190 (“There appears to be
an emerging (but disputed) view that researchers have some obligation to disclose
some genetic findings to some research participants.”); Pike, Rothenberg & Berkman,
supra note 54, at 9 (“By and large, scholars, practitioners, and advisory bodies agree
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The nature and duration of the relationship between the research
participant and the investigator may be the most important
consideration in determining whether investigators owe research
participants a duty to disclose research findings.124 Noting that
“researcher-participant relationships . . . vary in depth and duration,”
the Presidential Commission called for “clear, consistent, and practical
guidance” for researchers and institutions “about the ethical duties
owed to research participants with respect to incidental and secondary
findings.”125
Notably, arguments for disclosure of research findings are
premised on the same principle upon which the requirements for
informed consent rely.126 In particular, the obligation is premised on
the principle of autonomy: in order to make future autonomous and
informed health care decisions, the participant has a right to know
information discovered about him during the course of research. The
return of genetic results demonstrates respect for individual autonomy
and is being increasingly recognized as a “moral imperative.”127 Thus,
investigators may have an “affirmative duty . . . to truly give individuals
the informational access that they deserve.”128
The ethical duty to return research findings has been described
as potentially giving rise to “a legal obligation to offer findings of likely
clinical or reproductive significance to research participants.”129
Although there is no federal statutory requirement for disclosure of
research results,130 “[s]ome recent case law suggests that a legal trend
may be emerging toward recognizing an obligation on the part of a
researcher to provide a research participant with information acquired
from a study, when that information has clinical implications for the
participant.”131 Commentators have noted the increasing potential for
that researchers have an ethical obligation to offer to return some [incidental
findings.]”). See also Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30.
124
Gaile Renegar et al., Returning Genetic Research Results to Individuals: Points-toConsider, 20 BIOETHICS 24 (2006).
125
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 77.
126
See id. This point will be discussed further in Part IV.A.
127
See Misha Angrist, You Never Call, You Never Write: Why the Return of “Omic” Results
to Research Participants is Both a Good Idea and a Moral Imperative, 8 PER. MED. 651 (2011).
128
Alessi, supra note 108, at 1710.
129
Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30, at 367; see also Shalowitz & Miller,
supra note 116; Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Disclosing Individual Genetic
Results to Research Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8, 9 (2006).
130
Federal regulations that govern the conduct of human subjects research, such
as the Common Rule and FDA rules, provide no guidance on disclosing research
results.
131
Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30, at 366; Pike, Rothenberg &
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litigation claiming researcher negligence for failure to disclose to a
subject an individual research finding of medical significance.132 The
Grimes decision has been cited as evidence that courts may impose a
duty on investigators to inform study participants of research results.133
However, in Ande v. Rock, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals dismissed an
ordinary negligence claim that alleged that researchers failed to
disclose an individual research finding indicating that the plaintiffs’
child had cystic fibrosis.134 The study focused on whether early
nutritional intervention would improve outcomes for children
afflicted with the disease. Despite the fact that the child was tested for
the disease at birth as part of the study protocol, the plaintiffs were not
informed that their daughter had cystic fibrosis. She was diagnosed
with the disease at almost two years of age, at which point her mother
was pregnant with the plaintiffs’ second child, who was also afflicted
with the disease.135 In upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the
parents’ negligence claims, the court decided that the parents failed
to allege any duty-conferring relationship between themselves and the
researchers.136
Informed consent law generally requires disclosure of research
risks that are material and reasonably foreseeable.137 Because
secondary or incidental findings are discovered in the course of
research, research participants cannot claim that the information
would have been material to their initial decision to participate in the
research protocol. However, many scholars and policy makers have
called for disclosure of the possibility of discovering incidental or
secondary findings in the course of a research protocol at the outset of
research—i.e., during the informed consent process.138
Berkman, supra note 54. Wolf, Paradise, and Caga-anan discuss Blaz v. Michael Reese
Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Ill. 1999), in which an investigator had a duty,
absent a physician-patient relationship, to warn the research participant of the findings
that he might be at “greater risk of neural tumors in a way that might have permitted
their earlier detection and removal or other treatment.” Supra note 30, at 370.
According to the authors, the case “suggest[s] that researchers indeed have legally
cognizable duties towards research participants, although the scope of these duties is
not yet well-defined. Supra note 30, at 370.
132
Gordon, supra note 55, at 226.
133
Gordon, supra note 55, at 234.
134
647 N.W. 2d 265, 269 (WI Ct. App. 2002).
135
Id. at 270.
136
Id. at 276.
137
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
138
The Presidential Commission recommended that “[d]uring the informed
consent process, researchers should describe the types of incidental and secondary
findings that might arise to ensure that participants are as informed as possible.”
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 13.
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Importantly, however, scholars generally agree that disclosure of
an incidental finding “does not transform a research relationship into
a clinical one.”139 Thus, despite the evolving relationship between
investigators and participants as a result of the emerging obligation to
disclose (at least the potential for) research findings, that relationship
should not be treated as identical to the treatment relationship. As
both the doctor-patient and investigator-participant relationships
continue to shift over time in the wake of technological and other
advances and discoveries, the duties that arise under each will also
evolve.140
IV. A CALL FOR A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR INFORMED CONSENT
IN RESEARCH, BASED ON THE EVOLVING INVESTIGATOR-PARTICIPANT
RELATIONSHIP
Research participants who experience physical or dignitary
harms141 as a result of lack of informed consent still have little recourse.
While there is a robust literature focused on the absence of investigator
liability for failure to provide informed consent based on concerns
regarding information imbalance, bodily integrity, and autonomy,142
law and policy makers have yet to reach consensus about how or even
whether a research participant should have a private right of action for
failure to disclose the risks of a research protocol.
Further, the movement to require disclosure of research findings
may signal a shift in the right of participants to seek remedies directly
from researchers and research institutions who neglect to
communicate such information.143 The assertion that an investigator
is obliged to disclose (or offer the research participant the opportunity
139

PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 16.
In contrast, however, few have expressed concern that requiring return of results could
“turn the research enterprise into a proxy clinical enterprise.” Id. at 91 (quoting
Robert C. Green’s presentation to the Presidential Commission).
140
In fact, research involving genetic or other biological samples may signal the
development of a more tenuous investigator-participant relationship than in the past.
See Valerie G. Koch, PGTandMe: Social Networking-Based Genetic Testing and the Evolving
Research Model, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 33 (2012). Thus, rather than opening the door to
a private right of action based on a more robust duty of care, the proliferation of
research involving biological materials may, instead, diminish the duty investigators
have to their participants.
141
Dignitary harms are “caused by conduct that overrides patients’ autonomy,
treats them as less than human, and denigrates them as human beings.” Dena S. Davis,
The Ambiguous Effects of Tort Law on Bioethics: The Case of Doctor-Patient Communications,
21 J. CLIN. ETHICS 264, 265 (2010).
142
See BERG ET AL., supra note 4; Morreim, supra note 4, at 63; Mello, Studdert &
Brennan, supra note 4, at 40; Jansson, supra note 4, at 235; Pike, supra note 4, at 7.
143
See supra Section III.
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to receive) findings that are secondary to the research protocol is at odds
with the lack of obligation to disclose the primary risks of the research
protocol itself. As the hypotheticals at the outset of this Article
demonstrate, if society is to impose an affirmative obligation on
investigators to return findings unrelated to the research protocol, for
which failure to do so could result in tort liability, it seems incongruous
that research participants should not be able to recover for failure to
meet the lesser obligation to disclose the risks of the study in which the
subject is actually participating.
In light of the evolving research model, as represented by the
collection, retention, and testing of biological samples or use of
medical imaging, the traditional distinction between recovering for
lack of informed consent in the treatment and research contexts is
becoming less justifiable.
A. Autonomy as the Underlying Principle
Each duty at issue in the present analysis—(1) the duty of the
doctor to the patient to provide informed consent, (2) the duty of the
investigator to the participant to provide informed consent, and (3)
the duty of the investigator to disclose incidental or secondary findings
(or the possibility thereof) to participants—is premised on the
principle of autonomy.144 For purposes of this discussion, autonomy
encompasses the ability to choose to receive information about oneself
and to make and carry out informed decisions based on that
knowledge.145
144

This Article does not attempt to dissect or examine the autonomy principle in
significant depth. For such analysis, see IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY (James
W. Ellington trans., 1983); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rappaport ed.,
1978). For discussions of the principle of autonomy in the medical context, see KATZ,
supra note 14; Shultz, supra note 12; Alexander McCall Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23 (1997); Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in
the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L. J. 727 (1993).
145
It has been argued that the principle of autonomy has two different meanings,
each of which is invoked in different contexts to serve different purposes. The first,
liberal individualism, is “the idea that each person has a right to make his or her own
decisions about matters that affect that person in important ways and to act to
effectuate those decisions.” Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors:
Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 235,
238 (2003). The second, physical essentialism, “is the view that one is entitled to be
let alone, especially to have one’s body let alone.” Id. Similarly, Mark S. Stein and
Julian Savulescu distinguish between two conceptions of autonomy: the “liberal
conception” and the “libertarian conception” of autonomy. Mark S. Stein & Julian
Savulescu, Welfare versus Autonomy in Human Subjects Research, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303,
308 (2011). These two conceptions do not directly map onto the two categories that
Dworkin describes, although one could engage in a useful comparison. Important to
this analysis, Stein and Savulescu explain, “liberal autonomy will not honor a person’s
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For one, autonomy is consistently invoked as the operative
principle for informed consent in the treatment context. For example,
Marshall Kapp explains, the “ethical precept [of individual autonomy]
has been transformed slowly but steadily in the United States into the
enforceable legal doctrine of informed consent.”146 Peter Shuck asserts
that “[t]he most fundamental normative argument in favor of
requiring health care providers to obtain patients’ informed consent
to medical treatments proceeds from the principle of autonomy—the
notion that each mature individual has a right to make the basic
choices that affect her life prospects.”147
Second, the federal regulations governing human subjects
research also rely on the autonomy principle in its informed consent
requirements.148 As research evolves to focus more on human
biological materials than on physical interventions, harmed research
participants are less able to rely on the traditional claim for battery.149
As research shifts to focus on previously collected biological

decision to be a subject in an experiment unless that decision is made with full
information, under conditions that conduce to full understanding and authentic
choice.” In contrast, “[l]ibertarianism respects the actual choices of people, whether
or not those choices are made with full information,” and thus, “libertarian autonomy
cannot easily endorse the requirement of informed consent.” Id. at 309. Regarding
this latter definition, scholars have maintained that one’s right to make decisions
about oneself depends on the relative privacy of the choice, and the most private of
choices relates to those concerning one’s own body. Peter H. Shuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994). However, the first definition is most
frequently invoked by courts and scholars in the context of informed consent in both
the treatment (Dworkin, at 245) and research (Stein & Savulescu, supra note 145, at
308) contexts and in arguments in support of disclosing research findings.
Compounding the obligation of investigators to participants is the broader notion that
“investigators have ‘ancillary care’ obligations to their study participants.” Dal-Ré et
al., supra note 113, at 2. Notably, commentators have addressed the foundation of
ancillary care in the principle of autonomy, based on the relationship between the
investigator and research participant.
146
Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 91 (2007).
147
Shuck, supra note 145, at 924; see also George P. Smith II, The Vagaries of Informed
Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109 (2004). Evelyn Tenebaum states, “[t]he purpose of
informed consent laws is to ensure that patients receive sufficient information about
the risks and alternatives of medical procedures to make their own health care
decisions based on their personal values, preferences, and priorities.” Evelyn
Tenebaum, Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient Autonomy: An Appeal to
Abandon Objective Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 697 (2012).
148
Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical
Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605, 610 (2007) (“The common rule’s informed consent
requirement is designed to supply research subjects with all the information they need
to perform an autonomous risk-benefit analysis.”).
149
See supra Part I.A.
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specimens,150 donors’ continued status as research participants
becomes less certain,151 further implicating participants’ autonomy
interests and privacy rights.152
Third, supporters of a duty to return research findings often rely
upon the principles of respect for persons and autonomy, describing
the participants’ “presumptive entitlement” to information about
themselves.153 In one study, patients and public groups “emphasized
having ‘the power’ to choose disclosure or not, and that patients no
longer accept medical paternalism.”154
Thus, the autonomy principle upon which calls to disclose
research findings rely is the same as that upon which informed
consent—in both the treatment and research contexts—is premised.
In fact, some scholars have sought to explicitly link informed consent
at the outset of research to disclosure of research findings in order to
“ensure that the research process as a whole honors the notion of
respect for persons upon which human research subjects protections
are premised.”155 Further, technological advances in genomics may
advance “a more thoroughgoing respect for persons than was possible
when current policies governing human subject research were
developed.”156 Thus, application of the autonomy principle to justify
return of research results but not to support informed consent to
research is both incoherent and incongruous.157
150

Existing policy and current academic literature acknowledges that the federal
rules and regulations governing informed consent for research with human subjects
also apply to most research with biospecimens, except in some limited conditions.
David Wendler, One Time General Consent for Research on Biological Samples, 332(7540)
BRIT. MED. J. 544 (2006); Marshall B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving
Human Subjects: Do You Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLIN. PATHOL. 335–39 (2006); Barbara
J. Evans and Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging Translational Research Through Harmonization
of FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for Research with Banked Specimens,
27 J. LEG MED. 119 (2006).
151
See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 473.
152
David Magnus & Mildred K. Cho, Issues in Oocyte Donation for Stem Cell Research,
308(5729) SCIENCE 1747 (2005); Geoff Lomax & Steve Peckman, Stem Cell Policy
Exceptionalism: Proceed with Caution, 8 STEM CELL REV. AND REP. 299 (2011).
153
Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 116, at 738; see also Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan,
supra note 30, at 367; Dena S. Davis, Opportunistic Testing: The Death of Informed Consent?,
23 HEALTH MATRIX 35 (2013).
154
Anne Townsend et al., Paternalism and the ACMG Recommendations on Genomic
Incidental Findings: Patients Seen But Not Heard, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 751, 752 (2013).
155
Debra J.H. Mathews & Leila Jamal, Revisiting Respect for Persons in Genomic
Research, 5 GENES 1 (2014).
156
Id. at 2.
157
See Kapp, supra note 146, at 93 (“It is erroneous, even counterproductive, to
attempt to pick and choose among different categories of health care choices and then
apply the autonomy principle selectively.”).
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Regardless of whether informed consent serves the interest of
patient or participant autonomy in actuality, informed consent in the
research context relies on the same operative theoretical principles of
autonomy and respect for persons as informed consent in the
treatment context.158 Sharing these underlying principles further
supports treating the duties of both physicians and investigators
similarly. This Article proposes that, based on the consistently-applied
principle of not treating persons as mere means to an end, research
participants should have access to a private right of action against
investigators who fail to provide informed consent, similar to the access
patients have to a private right of action against doctors who do the
same. The establishment of a method to compensate research
participants for injuries sustained as a result of participating in a study
is the rational, just approach.159
B. The Standard of Care for a Private Right of Action for Informed
Consent in Research
However, the standard of care for such a private right of action
for informed consent in research should not be identical to the
standard for informed consent in treatment. Although research
participants should have a right to recover for failures of informed
consent, courts should consider applying a new (or at least modified)
approach—one other than medical malpractice or ordinary

158

An analysis of the advisability of continuing to rely on “autonomy rhetoric” in
the medical context is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the concept
of autonomy, see Dworkin, supra note 145, at 247 and Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient
& Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47 (1994).
159
Some have called for the establishment of a “distinct dignitary tort” for “serious
deficiencies of informed consent,” in both medical care and research. Morreim, supra
note 4, at 73–74 (citing Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975);
Joan Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment,
85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 270–72 (1999); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO WASH. L REV.
136, 150–51 (1992); Shultz, supra note 12, at 291–92; Alan Meisel, A ‘Dignitary Tort’ as
a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L., MED.
HEALTH CARE 210, 210–18 (1988); Grant H. Morris, supra note 20, at 322; Alan
Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L.
REV. 749, 763 (1986). In Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts
on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 74 (2003), E. Haavi Morreim notes:
[B]ecause standard informed consent doctrine usually limits recovery to
cases featuring a physical or other separate injury, it can fail to honor
human autonomy in cases where someone’s right to choose has been
abused without demonstrable physical damage. If this is a problem in
ordinary medicine, it is even more so in the research setting.
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negligence—in its analysis.160 For one, simple negligence claims are
inappropriate for remedying harms that occur in the research
context.161 The Ande v. Rock opinion is representative of this concern.162
By finding that no special relationship existed between the
investigators and the participant’s family, the court held that the
researchers owed no duties to the plaintiffs beyond those required
under ordinary negligence.163 The case demonstrates the problems
that arise when courts find research to be “nothing more than ordinary
conduct”—and the need to recognize that “[r]esearchers have many
duties that go well beyond those of ordinary citizens in the affairs of
daily life.”164
Second, although it may be argued that justice requires that
research subjects be treated like patients, with the attendant rights and
remedies, it does not necessarily follow that the same standards of care
be applied to participants in clinical trials as to patients in the clinical
setting.165 Requiring a different—and probably heightened166—
standard for disclosure of the risks of research (compared to
treatment) is necessary for a number of reasons. Despite the
similarities between treatment and research, approaching the two as
equivalents would be “generous but flawed.”167 The simplest reason for
160

Morreim, supra note 4, at 32. For example, the author recommends that
“conduct that is distinctive to research should be litigated under a research-focused
standard of care based on defects in the protocol, failures to adhere to the protocol,
breaches of research-specific informed consent, and the like.” Id. at 41; see also
Coleman, supra note 3, at 403.
161
Importantly, because there are significant differences between treatment and
research, there are also “major differences among research injuries, medical
malpractice, and ordinary negligence.” Morreim, supra note 4, at 30. The author
notes:
Across this spectrum, the message is not that research injuries are
somehow worse (or better) than medical malpractice, or that we need
to augment (or diminish) the available causes of action against research
errors. The message is simply that research is different, that courts need
to be more knowledgeable and to think more clearly if they are to build
an adequate foundation by which to guide conduct in this increasingly
important realm.
Id. at 32.
162
647 N.W. 2d 265 (WI Ct. App. 2002). See supra Section III.
163
647 N.W. 2d 265 (WI Ct. App. 2002).
164
Morreim, supra note 4, at 30.
165
Dal-Ré et al., supra note 113; Kathleen Cranley Glass & Duff Waring, The
Physician/Investigator’s Obligation to Patients Participating in Research: The Case of Placebo
Controlled Trials, 33 J. L. MED & ETHICS 575 (2005).
166
Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 379 (2002); Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 829
F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987).
167
Richardson & Belsky, supra note 94, at 26.
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a distinction between the standards of care is that researchers are not
always physicians.168 Where the investigator is a physician, conflating
the “roles of personal physician and clinical researcher . . . threatens
to exacerbate the therapeutic misconception.”169 More fundamentally
(and as discussed above), the primary goals of treatment and research
are distinct: the former is focused on the care and health of the
individual patient, while the latter aims to produce generalizable
knowledge.170 Moreover, in contrast to the decision to pursue
therapeutic treatment (which generally is based on a desire to
maintain or improve one’s own health or well-being), the decision to
participate in a research protocol is “highly individual”171 and may be
based on a variety or combination of reasons.172
Historically, when determining the standard for disclosure in the
treatment context, courts considered what a reasonable physician would
have disclosed under the circumstances.173 However, this “professional
standard” of informed consent has been replaced in at least half of the
states by the reasonable patient standard enunciated in Canterbury v.
Spence174 because of the former’s “excessive paternalism and the
effective immunity that it granted to defendants.”175 In contrast to tort
168

Richardson & Belsky, supra note 94, at 26.
Richardson & Belsky, supra note 94, at 26. For a full explanation and analysis
of the therapeutic misconception, see Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Therapeutic
Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN
RESEARCH 1 (2004); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Corrections and Clarifications, 26 IRB:
ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH 18 (2004).
170
Coleman, supra note 3; BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 281; Gordon, supra note 55.
171
E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice Doctrines Versus
Research Realities, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 474, 479 (2004) (explaining why the two
prevailing standards of care—the physician-based standard and the reasonable-patient
standard—for physicians’ duty of disclosure would be inappropriate in the research
context).
172
Id. (“People can have a wide variety of reasons for entering research, from
altruism to financial gain to a desperate, last-ditch hope for cure.”).
173
See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and
Experimental Therapy, supra note 166, at 367 (citing Craig v. Borcicky, 557 So. 2d 1253,
1258 (Ala. 1990); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Ark. 1980); Shabinaw v.
Brown, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188–94 (Idaho 1998); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98,
101, 103–04 (Ind. 1992); Ziegert v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450,
458–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128–31 (Me.
1980); Paul v. Lee, 568 N.W.2d 510, 514–16 (Mich. 1997); Robinson v. Bleicher, 559
N.W.2d 473, 478 (Neb. 1997); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 695–98 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1984);Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1997)).
174
Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 430 (2006).
175
See, e.g., Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, supra note 166, at 367 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9–11 (Cal. 1972); Largey v. Rothman,
169
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liability for failure to provide informed consent in the treatment
context—in which jurisdictions are split on the standard for what
information qualifies as material information for disclosure—tort
liability for failure to provide informed consent in the research context
should require the establishment of a particular and carefully crafted
standard of disclosure. Between these two standards, the reasonable
patient standard is likely a more appropriate approximation or model
of the standard of informed consent for research (in other words, a
reasonable participant standard).
In determining what this reasonable participant standard should
look like, one can look to (1) the standards set forth under federal
regulations and (2) those historically relied upon in the doctor-patient
relationship context. Further, the disclosure standard in research
could include both an objective and a “subjective element in deference
to individuals’ varying needs for personally important information, as
by inviting prospective enrollees to ask questions.”176
Thus, an appropriate baseline standard for disclosure of the risks
of research to participants is most likely one commensurate with the
disclosure requirements under the federal rules,177 which “require an
array of facts to be disclosed, such as the purposes, duration and
procedures of the research; any reasonably foreseeable risks or
discomforts; potential benefits to the enrollee or to others; available
alternatives to the research trial; and other specified information.”178
However, the current regulatory requirements for disclosure in
research may be insufficient to truly protect individuals who are
harmed as a result of investigators providing inadequate informed
consent. Courts should beware that the legal “floor” for acceptable
behavior may become the ethical standard for disclosure in research,
thereby undercutting participants’ rights to autonomy and respect.179
Disclosure standards should be crafted to address the significant and
distinct dignitary harms that can occur as a result of failure to disclose
540 A.2d 504, 508–09 (N.J. 1988)).
176
Morreim, supra note 171, at 479.
177
See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2152 (2000); see also Richard Ausness, The Case for
a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1253–54 (1996); Jansson,
supra note 4, at 245; Mastroianni, supra note 76, at 420 (referring to the
“comprehensiveness and specificity of the regulatory requirements for informed
consent”).
178
Morreim, supra note 4, at 66. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A.2d
807, 849 (Md. 2001) (emphasizing federal regulations as a source of informed consent
duties); Daum v. SpineCare Med. Group, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1285 (1997) (deriving
the standard of care for informed consent from the federal regulations).
179
Davis, supra note 141, at 270.
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the risks of a research protocol.180
C.

Some Final Thoughts and Caveats

This Article would be deficient if it failed to address the argument
that the establishment of a private right of action for failure to provide
informed consent in the research context could negatively impact the
research enterprise as a whole.181 Commentators have recognized that
requiring disclosure of research results to participants could give rise
to increased investigator liability.182 Despite its ability to compensate
injured research participants, allowing subjects a private right of action
“has potentially undesirable ramifications for research oversight
because it is likely to drive IRBs toward a more legalistic, mechanistic
approach to ethical review that does not further the interests of human
subjects or scientific progress.”183 Thus, the “threat of tort liability
could paralyze IRBs and could have a significant chilling effect on
clinical research.”184
180

It has also been suggested that there is (or will be) an identifiable and distinct
standard of care for return of research findings. For example, some have argued that
it would be appropriate “to apply a standard-of-care list of genes for which to actively
seek pathogenic variants in clinical research,” (Dal-Ré et al., supra note 113) equivalent
to the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics’s (ACMG)
recommendations for management of incidental genomic findings obtained in
clinical practice. Robert C. Green et al., supra note 117, at 565. The recommendations
proposed that clinical genome sequencing laboratories actively seek and report
pathogenic variants for 56 genes for 24 conditions for all patients, regardless of
patients’ age or expressed desire to receive the information. Id. at 570–71. Although
the ACMG’s recommendations are controversial (See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, George J.
Annas & Sherman Elias, Patient Autonomy and Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomics,
340 SCIENCE 1049 (2013); Neil A. Holtzman, ACMG Recommendations on Incidental
Findings are Flawed Scientifically and Ethically, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 750 (2013); Lainie
Friedman Ross, Mark A. Rothstein & Ellen Wright Clayton, Mandatory Extended Searches
in All Genome Sequencing: “Incidental Findings,” Patient Autonomy, and Shared Decision
Making, 310 JAMA 367 (2013))—in particular because they arguably subvert the
principles of autonomy and informed consent by calling for mandatory screening and
reporting of gene variants to clinicians and patients (See Robert Klitzman, Paul S.
Appelbaum & Wendy Chung, Return of Secondary Genomic Findings vs. Patient Autonomy:
Implications for Medical Care, 310 JAMA 369 (2013); Anne Townsend et al., supra note
154, at 1–2))—many believe that “it is reasonable to assume that a standard of care will
emerge for returning incidental genomic findings to patients receiving WGS/WES in
clinical contexts.” Dal-Ré et al., supra note 113, at 2.
181
See Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) (“If
experimental procedures are subject to hindsight evaluation by juries, so that failed
experiments threaten to impose enormous tort liability on the experimenter, there
will be fewer experimental treatments, and patients will suffer.”).
182
Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 474.
183
Mello, Studdert & Brennan, supra note 4, at 40.
184
See Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Malpractice: Risk and Responsibility in Human
Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 175, 213 (2004) (citing Richard A.
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On the other hand, some maintain that offering the return of
findings to research participants may increase public trust in the
research enterprise or even increase general awareness of research
protocols, thereby leading to more, rather than less, research
participation.185 Moreover, the threat of liability may not have the
chilling effect on research that some fear, because the risk of loss of
funding or suspension of research is already sufficiently threatening.186
Despite these arguments, whether increased liability would lead
to a significant decrease in useful and important research has not been
reliably determined. Even if allowing a private right of action for lack
of informed consent in the research context did disincentivize certain
research, this may be an acceptable trade-off for ensuring that research
participants are treated with the respect they are increasingly coming
to expect and have always deserved.187 Imposing liability for failure to
provide informed consent in the research context would serve the dual
purpose of deterring bad behavior by researchers and research
institutions and compensating research participants for the physical
and dignitary harms suffered as a result of such failure. Further, it sets
a standard for disclosure that reflects the rights of research participants
and the evolving expectation for shared decision-making in informed
consent. Thus, courts and legislatures188 should pay special attention
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753,
1847 (1996)); see also Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1987).
185
Fiona Alice Miller et al., supra note 118, at 48. See also Shalowitz & Miller, supra
note 116, at 740.
186
For example, within a two-year period in the early 2000s, the FDA and OHRP
“temporarily shut down research programs in at least seven institutions while they
remediated a host of compliance problems.” Barbara A. Noah, supra note 184, at 206.
See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Johns Hopkins Death Brings Halt to U.S.-Financed Human Studies,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A1 (reporting on the suspension of federal research
funding to Johns Hopkins due to fact that investigators missed published
research reporting serious side effects associated with the investigational compound,
and that the university had received 310 million dollars–more federal research funding
than any other university).
187
For a consideration of the balancing between research innovation and the right
of informed consent, see Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. the Regents of the University
of California: Balancing the Need for Biotechnology Innovation Against the Right of Informed
Consent, 5 HIGH TECH. L. J. 333 (1990).
188
In lieu of developing a private right of action through the courts, state
legislatures could establish a statutory tort. Although the most efficacious approach
to establishing a private right of action for research—be it statutorily or judicially—is
outside the scope of this Article, it is interesting to note that the court in Wright v. Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center expressly noted that Congress had “contemplated,
but ultimately rejected, a statutory mechanism for the compensation of individuals and
their families for injuries resulting from their participation in human subjects
research.” Wright, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, at 1290 n.1 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-381, at 90
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to balancing the rights of research participants with the interests of
furthering valuable research, in order to avoid allowing informed
consent to become a protector against liability rather than a protector
of prospective participants’ rights and welfare. In other words, the
standard for disclosure must ensure that the informed consent process
protects participants of research, rather than investigators and
research institutions against potential liability.
In contemplating tort liability for informed consent in the
research context, we would be well served to consider the greater issue
of compensation for research-related harms. Although such analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article (as is the current regime for tort
liability for research-related harms generally), it is important to note
the continuing and polarizing debate surrounding this issue, because
adopting a national compensation system for all harms that arise as a
result of participating in research may obviate the need for a private
right of action for informed consent in the research context.
Currently, the United States does not require compensation for
research related injuries for research participants.189 Nor is there any
indication that the federal government will implement such a system
in the foreseeable future. In 2011, the Presidential Commission for
the Study of Bioethical Issues, like other commissions and advisory
bodies before it, called for the federal government to study the issue
of research-related injuries to determine if there is a need for a
national system of compensation or treatment for research-related
injuries.190 However, the United States has conspicuously refused to
(1973)). Moreover, recently proposed revisions by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy are intended
to clarify the extent and scope of the Common Rule. Human Subjects Research
Projections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden,
Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44512 (2011). The Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) “raises the possibility that in the future
contributors will be asked for consent to research on data and samples collected in
clinical care, and thus could be asked at that point if they wish to be recontacted in
the future about findings of potential clinical importance.” Wolf et al., Managing
Incidental Findings, supra note 110, at 372. However, it makes no mention of providing
research participants who are harmed due to insufficient informed consent the
opportunity to recover from investigators who violate the requirements of the
Common Rule.
189
According to one study, only sixteen percent of academic medical centers in
the United States make it a policy to pay for the care of injured subjects. Renuka
Munshi & Urmila Thatte, Compensation for Research Related Injury, 4 PERSPECTIVES IN
CLIN. RESEARCH 61, 66 (2013).
190
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, Moral Science:
Protecting Participants in Human Subjects Research (2011), at 8, available at
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%20June%202012.pdf.
The Commission identified the fact that “previous presidentially appointed bioethics
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sign on to the Declaration of Helsinki—a set of ethical principles
regarding human subjects research developed for the medical
community—since before the turn of the century. The seventh edition
of the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Medical
Association in 2013, added a new general principle: that
“[a]ppropriate compensation and treatment for subjects who are
harmed as a result of participating in research must be ensured.”191
Thus, until the United States adopts a compensation system for harms
arising as a result of research participation, a private right of action for
informed consent is necessary, premised on the evolving relationship
between the investigator and research participant.

commissions and other duly appointed advisory bodies have made similar
recommendations regarding compensation or treatment for research-related injuries;
yet no clear response by the federal government has been issued.” Id. at 70.
191
WMA Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving
Human Subjects, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014). As a general principle, the Declaration states, “[w]hile the
primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never
take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.” Id.

